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THE NUISANCE ABATEMENT LAW AS A
SOLUTION TO NEW YORK CITY'S
PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL SEX




F OR generations, Times Square in mid-town Manhattan was known
as the entertainment mecca of the United States; indeed, the fame
of the area was the subject of song and story and of such appellations
as the "Great White Way." In the years gone by, the New York
theater - based in Times Square - was the equal and often the rival
of the London stage in the English speaking world.
Today, matters stand differently. A recent newspaper article de-
scribed Times Square in the following graphic language:
The theater languishes in this quartier latin, and the Times still lingers there, along
with about two dozen respectable restaurants. The rest is raunch and hustle in this
after-hours animal kingdom. To watch theatergoers fleeing for their lives after the final
curtain is to experience some of the primitive terror of the last days of Pompeii.,
In July of 1976, the Chairman of a New York City mayoral
committee reported its findings with respect to Times Square:
The Committee's findings to date have been mostly in the area of sex related
businesses and its impact on midtown. Succinctly stated, they are as follows:
1. Sex related businesses are not compatible with non-sex related businesses and drive
out non-sex related businesses.
2. The vacancies created by the outflow of non-sex related businesses are filled with
more sex related businesses.
3. Sex related businesses have undermined the economy of the midtown area with
resultant financial impact upon the City and City services.
4. Sex related businesses attract more felony type crime than non-sex related busi-
nesses and that the concept of victimless crime is a myth.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor O'Connor is a
consultant to the Midtown Enforcement Project in the Office of the Mayor of the City of New
York. Prior to his appointment to the faculty of the Law School, Professor O'Connor served as an
Assistant District Attorney of New York County, as an Assistant District Attorney of Queens
County, as a Special Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York, and as a law secretary
to two judges of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Professor O'Connor also engaged
in private civil practice for some years in New York City.
1. Sarris, Notes on Porn and Other Portents of Spring, The Village Voice, May 30, 1977, at
51.
2. Mayor's Midtown Citizens Committee, Report to Members of the Mayor's Midtown
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In the summer of 1976, the Honorable Sidney Baumgarten, Assis-
tant to the Mayor of the City of New York and Project Director of the
Midtown Enforcement Project, 3 requested the author to draft a Nui-
sance Abatement Law dealing with New York City's problem of illegal
sex related businesses. 4 Such proposed legislation was drafted by the
Citizens Committee 10 (July 6, 1976) reprinted in Midtown Enforcement Project, Report of
Operations for January 19, 1976 through December 8, 1976, app. E 4-10 (1976). With respect to
the finding that "the concept of the victimless crime is a myth," a recent study of juvenile
prostitution in the Times Square area states: "The suggestion that juvenile prostitutes are victims
is not made in a figurative sense. These girls are often the prey of individuals who see them as
unusually vulnerable; in addition, they are victimized by the conditions under which they live."
Criminal Justice Center of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Juvenile Prostitution in Midtown
Manhattan 58 (1977). In his introduction to the American edition of The Wolfenden Report, Karl
Menninger, M.D., stated: "Prostitution themes make amusing fare for motion picture and
musical comedy fans; audiences laugh heartily and commend the clever spectacle to their friends.
They can do this only because they know almost nothing of the sordid, miserable, stultifying,
syphilitic existence of the girls who look so cute in the movie stories." Committee on Homosexual
Offenses and Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report 5 (1963).
An extensive literature exists with respect to prostitution and its causes. See, e.g., F. Adler,
Sisters in Crime, The Rise of the New Female Criminal 55-83 (1975); The Wolfenden Report,
supra; Juvenile Prostitution in Midtown Manhattan, supra at 101-12 (bibliography).
3. "On January 19, 1976, the Midtown Enforcement Project (hereafter referred to as MEP or
Project) began operations. As proposed and sponsored by the office of Mayor Abraham D.
Beame, the purpose of the MEP is to operate a multi-agency Task Force designed to identify,
investigate and prosecute illegal activities in the Midtoin area. The Project consists of three
components: planning, inspectional and legal. It is funded by the Law Enforcement Assistant
Administration through the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services and the New
York City Criminal Justice Coordinating Council." Midtown Enforcement Project, Report of
Operations for January 19, 1976, through December 8, 1976, at 1 (1976). "One of the primary
functions of the Project is to 'consider the desirability of legislative changes', and the Planning
Unit, together with Consultants is charged with the responsibility of developing new enforcement
approaches and analyzing current laws and procedures in order to recommend needed changes."
Id. at 7. The Project has concerned itself with street prostitution, establishments which cater to
or foster street prostitution, off-street, organized prostitution establishments, premises featuring
live obscene and lewd conduct, pornographic material depicting children of young age or
bestiality, other major pornographic uses, and crimes related to the foregoing in the Times Square
area. Id. at 16-17. In its prosecutorial function, the Project has utilized three types of civil
actions: proceedings to enjoin permanently the maintenance of houses of prostitution pursuant to
Article 23 of Titie II of the New York Public Health Law, proceedings to abate violations of the
Administrative Code of the City of New York, and eviction proceedings under the New York
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. Id. at 12.
4. For purposes of this article, "illegal sex related bu.inesses" means houses of prostitution
(sometimes euphemistically referred to as "massage parlors"), book stores which sell obscene
books, establishments which conduct obscene live performances, obscene peep shows, and movie
theaters which show obscene movies. The term "prostitution" should be understood as that term is
defined in the New York Penal Law: "A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages
or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee." N.Y.
Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney Supp. 1976). The term "obscene" is to be understood as that term
is defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 235.000 (McKinney Supp. 1976), which definition is set forth In
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author and was passed by the New York City Council with one
change on July 6, 1977 and signed by the Mayor on July 28, 1977.-
The Nuisance Abatement Law6 is civil rather than criminal in
nature. 7 Substantively, it defines certain illegal sex oriented businesses
as nuisances. 8 More specifically, premises used for the purposes of
prostitution, 9 obscene performances,' 0 and the promotion of obscene
note 10 infra. Section 235.00(1) was amended by Chapter 989 of 1974 N.Y. Laws, effective
September 1, 1974, to bring New York's law relating to obscenity into conformity with the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Hechtman, Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. Penal Law § 235.00 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
5. Int. No. 1180, The Council of the City of New York, enacted as New York City Admin.
Code, Ch. 26 Title C (1977). A copy of the legislation appears in the appendix to this article.
The legislation as drafted by the author was changed in one respect by the enacted bill. See text
at notes 110-24 infra. Unless otherwise indicated all references are to the legislation as enacted
into law.
6. The Nuisance Abatement Law [hereinafter cited as NAL) amended Chapter 16 of the
Administrative Code of the City of New York by adding a new title C.
7. NAL § C16-2.3.
8. Id. § C16-2.2(a)-(c).
9. Id. § C16-2.2(a). The term "prostitution" has the same meaning as defined in N.Y. Penal
Law § 230.00 (McKinney Supp. 1976). The Penal Law definition is set forth in note 4 supra. With
respect to actions to enjoin a nuisance defined therein, the subdivision provides, in language
borrowed from N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2324(3)(a) (McKinney 1971), that "evidence of the
common fame and general reputation of the ... [premises] ... shall be competent evidence to
prove the existence of the public nuisance." NAL § C16-2.2(a). Again, in language borrowed from
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2324(3)(c), the subdivision provides that if evidence of the reputation of
the premises is sufficient to establish the existence of a public nuisance, "it shall be prima fade
evidence of knowledge thereof and acquiescence and participation therein and responsibility for
the nuisance" on the part of certain persons connected with the premises. Id. The subdivision also
provides that two or more convictions for acts of prostitution on the premises within one year
preceding an action respecting the nuisance "shall be presumptive evidence" that the premises are
a public nuisance. Id.
10. NAL § C16-2.2(b). The term "obscene" has the same meaning as defined in the New York
Penal Law: "Any material or performance is 'obscene' if (a) the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to the prurient interest in sex, and (b) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive
manner, actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism,
masochism, excretion or lewd exhibition of the genitals, and (c) considered as a whole, it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with
reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the
circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially susceptible
audience." N.Y. Penal Law § 235.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
The term "performance," according to the subdivision, also has the same meaning defined by
New York Penal Law. " 'Performance' means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition
performed before an audience." Id. § 235.00(3) (McKinney 1967). NAL § C16-2.2(b) provides that
two or more convictions of persons for "production, presentation or direction of an obscene
performance or for participation in such performance" on the premises within one year preceding
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material11 are defined as nuisances. Because experience has indicated
that illegal sex oriented premises are often in violation of various state
and local laws unrelated to sexual activity, 12 the Nuisance Abatement
Law also declares that premises which are in violation of certain of
such laws are public nuisances. 13
Procedurally, the statute empowers the New York City corporation
counsel to maintain civil actions, on behalf of the City, against any of
the nuisances defined in the statute. 14 An action for a permanent
injunction lies with respect to certain defined nuisances; 15 an action
an action respecting the nuisance shall be presumptive evidence that the premises are a public
nuisance.
11. NAL § C16-2.2(c). Like section C16-2.2(b), section C16-2.2(c) provides that the term
"obscene" has the same meaning as defined in the relevant section of the New York Penal Law.
For the definition of "obscene," see note 10 supra. The term "material" has the same meaning as
defined in the New York Penal Law. "'Material' means anything tangible which is capable of
being used or adapted to arouse interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation,
sound or in any other manner." N.Y. Penal Law § 235.00(2) (McKinney 1967). "Promote" Is
intended by the author to have the same meaning as that given it in section 235.00(4) of the Penal
Law: " 'Promote' means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer,
transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or
agree to do the same." Id. § 235.00(4). The subdivision provides that two or more convictions of
persons for promotion of or possession with intent to promote obscene material on the premises
within one year preceding an action respecting the nuisance shall be presumptive evidence that
the premises are a public nuisance.
12. Report of Operations, supra note 3, at 12-14 & apps. D2-D13.
13. NAL § C16-2.2(d)-(1). For example, subdivision (d) would include premises wherein there
are occurring violations of the New York City Building Code (premises operated without a
certificate of occupancy or contrary to a certificate of occupancy or premises wherein unau-
thorized structural changes were made).
Subdivision (e) would include premises which are nuisances as defined by the New York City
Health Code, premises which are "infected and uninhabitable" houses as defined by the Health
Code, and premises which litter in violation of the Sanitation Code.
Subdivision (f) would include premises which are used for businesses not licensed as required
by law such as unlicensed massage businesses.
Subdivision (g) would include premises wherein, within the period of one year prior to the
commencement of an action under the proposed bill, there had occurred five or more violations of
articles 220 (controlled substances offenses) and 225 (gambling offenses) of the New York Penal
Law.
Subdivision (h) would include premises wherein alcoholic beverages are being sold without a
license.
Subdivisions (i) and (j) would include premises which are being operated in violation of certain
of the environmental provisions of the New York City Administrative Code.
Subdivision (k) would include premises which are in violation of the New York City Zoning
Resolution regulating "adult uses." In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that Detroit's
zoning resolution regulating "adult uses" was on its face constitutional. Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Subdivision () would include premises which are criminal nuisances as defined by the New
York Penal Law. N.Y. Penal Law § 240-45 (McKinney 1967).
14. NAL § C16-2.3(a)-(b).
15. Id. § C16-2.3(a). An action to enjoin permanently the maintenance of a house of
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for a civil penalty is applicable to one other nuisance defined in the
statute. 16 In an action for a permanent injunction, if sufficient proof
were presented by the corporation counsel, the court, upon ex parte
application, could grant a temporary restraining order or a temporary
closing order, or both, pending the hearing and determination of a
motion for a preliminary injunction. 17 In an action for a civil penalty,
if sufficient proof were presented by the corporation counsel, the court,
upon ex parte application, could grant a temporary order restraining
the persons maintaining the business from making a "bulk transfer" of
inventory and assets pending the hearing and determination of a
motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin such transfer.18
H-. THE INADEQUACY OF PRESENT LAWS RELATING TO
ILLEGAL SEX RELATED BUSINESSES
1. Laws Relating to Prostitution
In a comprehensive manner, New York labels as criminal conduct,
participation by the "prostitute" and the "customer" in an act of
prostitution, as well as the promoting and permitting of prostitution.
The Penal Law defines as offenses: prostitution (engaging in or offering
to engage in sexual conduct with another for a fee), 19 patronizing a
prostitute (engaging in sexual conduct with another and paying for
such service), 20 promoting prostitution (providing the services of pros-
prostitution (NAL § C16-2.2(a)) and certain nuisances violative of city and state statutes would lie
(NAL § C16-2.2(d)-(1)).
16. See text accompanying notes 113-22 infra; NAL § C16-2.3(b).
17. NAL §§ C16-2.6, C16-2.8, C16-2.9.
18. NAL §§ C16-2.15, C16-2.16, C16-2.17.
19. N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney Supp. 1976); see note 4 supra. Pursuant to section
230.10, a male, who offers to sell his sexual services to either a male or female is guilty of
prostitution. Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for no more than
three months (id. § 70.15(2)), or by a fine of no more than $500 (id. § 80.05(2)), or by probation
for no more than one year (id. § 65.05(3)(b)), or by a sentence of unconditional discharge (id. §
65.20).
Chapter 344, 1976 N.Y. Laws, effective July 11, 1976, added section 240.37 to the Penal Law.
Section 240.37 makes loitering for the purposes of engaging in prostitution a punishable offense.
The statute has been criticized as unconstitutionally vague. See Hechtman, Practice Commentary
to § 240.37 (McKinney Supp. 1976). One court, however, has sustained the statute against such
attack. People v. Smith, 88 Misc. 2d 590, 393 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
20. Section 230.05 of the Penal Law provides: "A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute
when: 1. Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays a fee to another person as compensation for
such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him; or 2. He pays or agrees
to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or
a third person will engage in sexual conduct with him; or 3. He solicits or requests another
person to engage in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee." N.Y. Penal Law § 230.35
(McKinney 1967). Patronizing a prostitute is a violation punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 15 days (id. § 70.15(4)), or by a fine of not more than $250 (id. § 80.05(4)), or by a
1977]
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titutes as a business enterprise), 2 I and permitting prostitution (allowing
the use of premises for prostitution purposes). 22 The New York Penal
Law further provides a variety of punishments for these defined
criminal acts, including imprisonment, fines, probation, and condi-
tional and unconditional discharges.
23
conditional discharge for no more than a term of one year (id. § 65.03(3)), or by a sentence of
unconditional discharge (id. § 65.20).
21. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 230.20, 230.25, 230.30 (McKinney 1967). Promoting prostitution is
divided into three degrees. The basic crime, promoting prostitution in the third degree, is defined
by section 230.20 as follows: "A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree
when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution." Id. § 230.20. Promoting prostitution Is
raised to the second degree when a defendant advances or profits from prostitution by means of a
house of prostitution, or by means of a "prostitution business or enterprise involving prostitution
activity by two or more prostitutes," or when a defendant advances or profits from tile
prostitution of a person under nineteen years of age. Id. § 230.25. The crime is raised to the first
degree when a defendant advances prostitution by force or intimidation, or advances or profits
from the prostitution of a person less than sixteen years. Id. § 230.30.
The Penal Law defines the terms "advance prostitution" and "profit from prostitution" as
follows: "1. 'Advance prostitution.' A person 'advances prostitution' when, acting other than as a
prostitute or as a patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage In
prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for
prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a
prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an
act or enterprise of prostitution. 2. 'Profit from prostitution.' A person 'profits from prostitution'
when, acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitu-
tion services, he accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or
understanding with any person whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of
prostitution activity." N.Y. Penal Law § 230.15 (McKinney 1967).
The crime in its third degree is a class A misdemeanor (id. § 230.20) punishable by
imprisonment for no more than one year (id. § 70.15(1)), or by a fine of no more than $1,000 (id. §
80.05(1)), or by probation for no more than three years (id. § 65.00(3)(b)), or by a conditional
discharge for a term of no more than one year (id. § 65.05(3)(b)), or by a sentence of unconditional
discharge (id. § 65.20). The crime in its second degree is a class D felony (id. § 230.25) punishable
by imprisonment either for an indefinite term of not more than seven years or by a definite term
of one year or less (id. § 70.00(1), (2)(d) & (4)), or by a fine not exceeding twice the amount of the
defendant's gain from the commission of the crime (id. § 80.00(2)), or by probation for no more
than five years (id. § 65.00(3)(a)(i)).
The crime in its first degree is a class C felony (id. § 230.30) punishable by imprisonment either
for an indefinite term of not more than fifteen years (id. § 70.00(1) & (2)(c)), or by a fine not
exceeding twice the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the crime (id. §
80.00(2)), or by probation for no more than five years (id. § 65.00(3)(a)(i)), or by a conditional
discharge for a term of no more than three years (id. § 65.05(3)(a)), or by a sentence of
unconditional discharge (id. § 65.20).
22. "A person is guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of
premises which he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable
effort to halt or abate such use. Permitting prostitution is a class B misdemeanor." N.Y. Penal Law
§ 230.40 (McKinney 1967); see note 19 supra for the punishments prescribed for a class B
misdemeanor.
23. See notes 19-22 supra.
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On its face, the Penal Law would appear to be an effective weapon
for the elimination of illegal sex related businesses whose principal
raison d'etre is prostitution. This is not, however, the case. Let us
suppose that a police officer visits the "Happy House Massage Parlor"
(a house of prostitution), and is greeted by a receptionist who offers
him the massage services of any one of ten females. The officer selects
one "Xaviera" ("X"), goes witth her to a cubicle, and is there solicited to
engage in sexual conduct for a fee. At this point, the officer has
reasonable cause to arrest X for prostitution.2 4 But the officer lacks
sufficient grounds to arrest the receptionist or any other employee of
Happy House for any offense. Let us assume that the officer arrests X
on a prostitution charge. If she elects to stand trial, she could defend
either by completely denying the charge-posing an issue of credibility
for resolution by the fact finder 25-or by claiming entrapment. 26 If
24. See N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney 1967), quoted in note 4 supra. The Criminal
Procedure Law defines reasonable cause as follows: " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person
has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses
facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a
person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such
offense was committed and that such person committed it .... " N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 70.10(2)
(McKinney 1971).
The term "reasonable cause" has the same meaning as "probable cause" in the fourth
amendment to the Constitution. People v. Lombardi, 18 App. Div. 2d 177, 180, 239 N.Y.S.2d
161, 164 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1014, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595, 195 N.E.2d 306 (1963); People v.
Fields, 50 App. Div. 2d 870, 376 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (2d Dep't 1975), modified 53 App. Div. 2d
621, 385 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has defined the term "probable
cause" in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), and in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
Section 140. 10(1)(a) provides: "[A] police officer may arrest a person for (a) Any offense when he
has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such offense in his pres-
ence .... ." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1971).
25. In New York City, since the punishment for prostitution is limited to no more than three
months' imprisonment (see note 19 supra), the defendant would not be entitled to a jury trial in
New York City Criminal Court. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 340.40(2) (McKinney 1971); see
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (the jury trial guarantee of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments applies only to state criminal trials where the punishment which could be imposed
exceeds six months).
26. In New York, entrapment is an affirmative defense which a defendant has the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 25.00(2), 40.05 (McKinney
1975). Section 40.05 defines entrapment in the following manner- "In any prosecution for an
offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because
he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation
with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution,
and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Inducement or
encouragement to commit an offense means active inducement or encouragement_ Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment."
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successful on either defense, X would be entitled to an acquittal. If
unsuccessful, X could face incarceration for a term of up to three
months. 27 In Manhattan, however, the odds are that X would not be
sentenced to a prison term. 28 In any event imprisonment of X would
simply mean that, for the term of her 'incarceration, she would be
prevented from plying her trade. Her colleagues in Happy House and
its owners, managers, and agents would still have a viable prostitution
business.
Of course, in our illustration, law enforcement is not confined to the
technique of having undercover police officers enter Happy House in
the hope of being solicited to engage in sex. The local prosecutor, if he
had the time and resources, could decide to investigate Happy House
by means of a grand jury. 29 Let us assume that the prosecutor
subpoenas X and her nine colleagues hoping to extract evidence from
them before the grand jury that would implicate the owners and
operators of Happy House. If the witnesses exercised their constitu-
tional right not to incriminate themselves, 30 the grand jury would have
to grant them immunity or the prosecutor would be unable to obtain
Id. § 40.05. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932); Model Penal Code § 2.13 (1962). With respect to the practical problems raised by
the doctrine of entrapment in prostitution cases, see L. Tiffany, D. McIntyre, D. Rotenberg,
Detection of Crime (1967); American Bar Foundation Administration Criminal Justice Series,
214-30, 273-82 (1974).
27. See note 19 supra.
28. See Midtown Enforcement Project, Report of Operations for January 19, 1976 through
December 8, 1976, app. B, 10-2-12-8 (1976). A recent study of juvenile prostitution in the Times
Square area has concluded that imprisonment is not the solution for juvenile prostitution.
Criminal Justice Center of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Juvenile Prostitution in Midtown
Manhattan (1977).
29. "A grand jury is a body consisting of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-three
persons, impaneled by a superior court and constituting a part of such court, the functions of
which are to hear and examine evidence concerning offenses ... and to take action with respect
to such evidence as provided in section 190.60." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.05 (McKinney
1971). In essence, section 190.60 together with sections 190.65(1) and 190.70(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Law authorize a grand jury to prefer charges against an individual if the evidence
before them is legally sufficient to justify such action, and if they are satisfied that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the individual committed an offense. Id. §§ 190.60, 190.65(1l),
190.70(1).
Section 190.25(6) provides: "The legal advisors of the grand jury are the court and the district
attorney." Id. § 190.25(6). Finally, section 190.50(2) provides: "The people may call as a witness
in a grand jury proceeding any person believed by the district attorney to possess relevant
information or knowledge." Id. 190.50(2).
30. The fifth amendment provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The privilege is, of course, binding
on the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
NUISANCE ABATEMENT LAW
their testimony. 31 Assuming the witnesses were granted immunity and
gave testimony that implicated the owners and operators of Happy
House in the crime of promoting prostitution, 32 the prosecutor could
not legally convict the owners and operators on this testimony alone.
New York law would require evidence independent of the prostitutes'
testimony in this situation. 33 Such corroboration would be impossible
to obtain unless Happy House kept incriminating books and records or
unless the prosecutor could comply with the stringent New York
statutory requirements for an eavesdropping warrant 34 to obtain the
required corroboration. If the prosecutor had legally sufficient evidence
to obtain an indictment, the indicted Happy House entrepreneurs
could remain in business if they were free on bail. If convicted and
sentenced to prison, the entrepreneurs could still operate Happy House
if they appealed and managed to remain free on bail pending the
appeal. Finally, even if the convicted entrepreneurs went to prison,
other persons who had managed to elude prosecution could continue
the operations of Happy House.
It should be clear from the above analysis that, while the substan-
tive provisions of New York's Penal Law prohibit the operation of
Happy House, the State's criminal procedure provisions are ill suited
to terminating its operations.
On the other hand, as a matter of substantive civil law, in its Public
Health Law, New York has declared houses of prostitution to be
nuisances35 and has provided injunctive procedures for their elimina-
tion.36 The statute provides that an action in equity may be main-
tained in the supreme court by the district attorney or any citizen of
the county involved to "perpetually" enjoin the nuisance existing in
that county.37 The action is commenced by the service of a summons
and verified complaint upon the persons maintaining the nuisance. 3
8
31. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.40(2) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
32. See notes 19-22 supra.
33. "A person shall not be convicted of promoting prostitution... solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of a person whose prostitution activity he is alleged to have advanced... or from whose
prostitution activity he is alleged to have profited ... " N.Y. Penal Law § 230.35 (McKinney 1967).
34. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 700.05-700.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976).
35. Section 2320 of the Public Health Law provides: "1. Whoever shall erect, establish,
continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any building, erection, or place used for the purpose of...
prostitution is guilty of maintaining a nuisance. 2. The building, erection, or place, or the ground
itself, in or upon which any... prostitution is conducted, permitted, or carried on, continued, or
exists, and the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments, and movable property used in conducting
or maintaining such nuisance are hereby declared to be a nuisance and shall be enjoined and
abated .... N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2320 (McKinney 1971).
36. Id. § 2321.
37. Id. §§ 2321(1)-(2) & 2322.
38. Id. §§ 2321(3), (5). On or before the commencement of the action, plaintiff may file with
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The court is authorized to grant an ex parte order temporarily restrain-
ing the maintenance of the nuisance, pending the hearing and determi-
nation of a motion for a preliminary injunction. 3 9 If a permanent
injunction is granted, the statute provides that the final judgment shall
contain provisions for the seizure and sale of the chattels used in the
maintenance of the nuisance and for the closing of the premises for one
year. 4
0
Procedurally, the injunctive action established by the New York
Public Health Law is far superior to a criminal prosecution as a means
of eliminating houses of prostitution. The action for injunctive relief
seeks the direct abatement of the house of prostitution, while the
criminal prohibition seeks to punish the persons operating the illegal
business. As has been seen, the criminal provisions will not necessarily
effect an abatement of the illegal premises. 4 1 There is, nevertheless, a
flaw in the injunctive proceedings defined by New York's Public
Health Law, since, while the action is pending, a defendant may, as a
practical matter, brazenly disregard a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction prohibiting his continued maintenance of the
house of prostitution. There is little reason to believe that the entre-
preneur of a house of prostitution will obey a temporary court order to
cease and desist when he has already disregarded Penal Law prohi-
bitions against his criminal activities and when the pain of contempt is
but a miniscule item balanced against the profits of his illegal business.
Moreover, these factors also serve to give the entrepreneur reason to
delay the trial date for as long as possible.
This defect in the New York Public Health Law was one of the
factors which prompted the request that the author draft the Nuisance
Abatement Law. The new law attempts to remedy the defect by
authorizing, in appropriate circumstances, an ex parte temporary
closing order and the continuance of the provisions of the ex parte
the County Clerk a copy of the complaint "together with a notice of the pendency of the action,
stating the names of the parties and the object of the action, and containing a brief description of
the property, real and personal, in the county affected thereby." Id. § 2321(3). Such filed notice is
constructive notice to a purchaser from, or incumbrancer against, any defendant named in the
notice of pendency with respect to the property in question. Any person whose conveyance or
incumbrance is recorded after the filing of the notice "is bound by all proceedings taken in the
action after such filing to the same extent as if he were a party." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6501
(McKinney 1963). The notice is ordinarily effective for three years after its filing. Id. § 6513.
39. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2321(4), (5) & 2323 (McKinney 1971).
40. Id. § 2329(1). The owner of the closed premises can have the premises re-opened if he
pays the costs of the action, posts a bond in the amount of the full value of the property, and
satisfies the court that he will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent it from being again
established. Id. § 2332(1).
41. See text at notes 19-34.
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order in a preliminary injunction. 4 2 A temporary closing order would
authorize the New York City Police to padlock the premises and to
keep them closed pending further order of the court. The logical
outcome of such an order would be to discourage operators of houses
of prostitution from seeking to delay their trials. In addition, the law
requires a speedy adversary hearing and a determination of the pro-
priety of the ex parte order. In the event the closing order is continued, a
speedy trial and determination of the action are required.4 3
2. Laws Relating to Obscenity
In a manner comparable to its provisions against prostitution, the
Penal Law also prohibits many aspects of the obscenity industry.
Specifically, the Penal Law defines and punishes obscene perfor-
mances44 and the promotion of obscene material. 45  For example,
persons who knowingly publish, manufacture, wholesale, or retail
obscene books or magazines are guilty of the crime of obscenity in one
of two degrees. 46 Likewise, any person producing, presenting, direct-
ing, or participating in an obscene live show or play would be guilty of
the crime of second degree obscenity. 47
For the same reasons that the New York Penal Law's anti-
prostitution provisions are ineffective in eliminating houses of prostitu-
tion,48 its criminal provisions proscribing obscenity are not effective
weapons for the elimination of the obscenity entrepreneur.
42. NAL §§ C16-2.6(a).
43. Id. §§ C16-2.8(a), C16-2.10(b), (c).
44. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 235.00, 235.05 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1976).
45. Id. §§ 235.05-.06 (McKinney Supp. 1976). Section 235.05 provides: "A person is guilty of
obscenity in the second degree when, knowing its content and character, he: 1. Promotes, or
possesses with intent to promote, any obscene material; or 2. Produces, presents or directs an
obscene performance or participates in a portion thereof which is obscene or which contributes to
its obscenity. Obscenity in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor." Id. § 235.05. For the
punishment prescribed for a Class A misdemeanor, see note 21 supra.
Section 235.06 provides: "A person is guilty of obscenity in the first degree when, knowing its
content and character, he wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale promote, any
obscene material. Obscenity in the first degree is a Class D felony." Id. § 235.06. For the
punishment prescribed for a Class D felony, see note 21 supra. The definitions of the terms
"obscenity" and "performance" are set forth in note 10 supra, the terms "material" and "promote"
are defined in note 11 supra.
Section 235.00(5) defines the term "wholesale promote" as follows: " 'Wholesale promote' means
to manufacture, issue, sell, provide, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute,
circulate, disseminate, or to offer or agree to do the same for purposes of resale." N.Y. Penal Law
§ 235.00(5) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
46. See note 45 supra.
47. See note 45 supra.
48. See text at notes 19-34 supra.
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New York has created a civil action to enjoin permanently certain
aspects of the obscenity trade. 49 This statute authorizes a district
attorney and other specified public officials to bring an action in state
supreme court to enjoin the publication, distribution, sale, and display
of obscene material such as books, magazines, and movies. 50 A trial is
mandated within one day of the joinder of issue and a decision is
required within two days of the conclusion of the trial. 51 In the event a
permanent injunction is granted, the judgment must provide for the
seizure and destruction of the material found to be obscene. 5
2
Although it provides a speedy and effective remedy against obscene
material such as books or magazines, the statute has important
shortcomings as a procedure for directly attacking the business of the
obscenity entrepreneur. It does not, for example, deal at all with the
purveyor of live shows and plays. Furthermore, in dealing with the
manufacturer of obscene material, the statute focuses on particular
editions of a book or certain issues of a magazine. Thus, if the
manufacturer loses the injunction action he remains free to manufac-
ture other obscene material and to continue to produce different
versions or editions of previously enjoined material.
To cure the deficiencies inherent in New York's criminal and civil
regulation of obscenity, the Nuisance Abatement Law focuses on the
obscenity entrepreneur as a business entity. For constitutional rea-
sons, the action for injunctive relief is not available as a means of
eliminating the large scale business dealer in obscenity.5 3 Therefore,
the statute provides an action for a civil penalty of $1,000 for each day
a premises has been used for the sale or promotion of obscene
material. 54 There is also provision in the judgment for the seizure and
destruction of the material found to be obscene.5 5 The civil penalty
provisions of the judgment could be satisfied by the seizure and sale of
the non-obscene assets of the defendant.5 6 Enforcement of the judg-
ment by a combination of seizure and destruction of the obscene
49. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6330 (McKinney Supp. 1976). In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that section 22-a of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure (McKinney 1954) did not contravene the first amendment provision
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
Const. amend. I.
50. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6330(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
51. Id. § 6330(2).
52. Id. § 6330(3).
53. See text at notes 110-21 infra.
54. NAL §§ C16-2.2(b) and (c), C16-2.13, C16-2 14(a). See notes 10-11 supra for definitions
of the terms "obscene," "performance," "promotion," and "material."
55. NAL § C16-2.19(a).
56. See id. § C16-2.19(b).
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material and seizure and sale of the other property would deprive the
obscenity entrepreneur of the means of continuing his illegal business.
III. THE NUISANCE ABATEMENT LAW
The Nuisance Abatement Law consists of both substantive and
procedural provisions. Substantively, it defines twelve nuisances. 57
Procedurally, it creates an action for a permanent injunction against
eleven of the defined nuisances58 and a civil penalty With respect to
one.
59
Three of the defined nuisances relate to illegal sex oriented busi-
nesses and nine pertain to non-sexual violations of state and local law.
The three illegal sex oriented businesses defined as nuisances are
premises used for (1) purposes of prostitution;60 (2) for purposes of
obscene performances;6' and (3) for purposes of promoting obscene
material, 62 as those terms are defined by the New York Penal Law. 63
The other defined nuisances deal with such matters as violations of the
Building Code, the Health Code, and licensing laws. 64
Procedurally, an action for a permanent injunction would lie to
enjoin the operation of a premises for the purposes of prostitution, or
of obscene performances, and to enjoin the operation of a premises
constituting a non-sexual nuisance defined by the legislation. 65 With
respect to premises conducted for the purpose of promoting obscene
material, only the action for a civil penalty would lie. 66 Both actions
could be brought solely by the corporation counsel of the City of New
York. 67
1. The Action for a Permanent Injunction
An action for a permanent injunction would be commenced in the
supreme court by service of the summons in the manner prescribed by
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules upon the owner, lessor,
and lessee of the property where the nuisance is being maintained.68 In
57. Id. § C16-2.2.
58. Id. §§ C16-2.4, C16-2.5(a).
59. Id. §§ C16-2.13, C16.2.14(b).
60. Id. § C16-2.2(a).
61. Id. § C16-2.2(b).
62. Id. § C16-2.2(c).
63. See notes 9-11 supra.
64. NAL §§ C16-2.2(d)-(1); see text at notes 12-13 supra.
65. NAL §§ C16-2.4, C16-2.5(a).
66. Id. §§ C16-2.13, C16-2.14.
67. Id. §§ C16-2.3(a)-(b).
68. Id. §§ C16-2.5(a), (b) & (d); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 301-26 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1976). Since the action is civil in nature, service of the summons on a domestic corporation or a
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rem jurisdiction over the premises involved would be obtained by
affixing the summons to the door of the premises and by mailing the
summons by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to
one of the owners of some interest in the property.69 A notice of
pendency of the action could be filed against the property involved
when the action is commenced or thereafter. 70 As is true of civil
actions in New York generally, the complaint could be served with the
summons, or afterwards, upon demand therefor by the defendant. 71
Thereafter, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR")
provisions governing pleadings and pre-trial disclosure would be appli-
cable. 72 Trial of the action would be by the court without a jury. 73
After the commencement of the action, the court would be em-
powered, upon a contested hearing, to grant a preliminary injunction
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state could be effected by service on the New
York Secretary of State. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 306(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Because the
action is equitable in natue, the six year statute of limitations would apply and so would the
doctrine of laches. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976); Feldman v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 18 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dep't 1940), Of
course, because of the civil nature of the action, the Civil Practice Law rules relating to joinder of
parties in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 1001-04 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976) would be applicable.
Venue of the action would lie in the county where the nuisance is being maintained. NAL §
C16-2.5(b).
69. NAL § C16-2.5(c). In fact, the corporation counsel would be required to name the
premises as a defendant by describing it by block, lot number, and street address and by naming
at least one of the owners of some part of or interest in the property as defendant. Id. §
C16-2.5(b).
70. Id. § C16-2.5(e); see note 38 supra.
71. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 3012(a)-(b) (McKinney 1974). The action is civil in nature. NAL §
C16-2.5(a).
72. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 3001-44, 3101-40 iMcKinney 1974 & Supp. 1976).
73. In New York, equitable actions are not triable as of right by a jury. Expressway Realties
v. Sidjack Realty Corp., 35 Misc.2d 639, 230 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 17 App. Div. 2d 926,
233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1st Dep't 1962); In re Britton, 187 Misc. 70, 60 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sur. Ct.
1946). An action for a civil penalty would be triable by a jury since it involves a claim for a sum
of money only. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4101(1) (McKinney 1963). Under the circumstances
defined by NAL section C16-2.5, the corporation counsel could couple a claim for Injunctive
relief and a demand for a penalty. If he did so, he would not thereby become entitled to a jury
trial; nevertheless, the defendant might well be entitled to a jury trial with respect to the Issues
raised by the penalty claim. DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993
(1917).
The proposed statute creates several presumptions to enable the corporation counsel to make
out a prima facie case at trial. Several have already been mentioned. See note 9 supra. The
legislation provides that the person in whose name the real estate involved is recorded In the
office.of the County Clerk or City Register is presumptively the owner thereof. NAL § C16-2.5(f).
It also provides that, whenever there is evidence that a person was a manager, operator,
supervisor, or in any way in charge of the premises at the time of the nuisance, a presumption
arises that such person was an agent or employee of the owner or lessee of the premises. Id. §
C16-2.5(g).
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either closing the premises or enjoining the maintenance of the nui-
sance. 74 In this event, a trial of the action would be required to be held
within three days of the order and the action determined within three
days of the conclusion of the trial. 75 Upon a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court could grant, ex parte, a temporary order restrain-
ing continuation of the nuisance or a temporary order closing the
premises. 76 The legislation provides that such temporary orders could
be granted only upon the court's being satisfied that there is "clear and
convincing evidence that a public nuisance is being conducted... and
that the public health, safety or welfare immediately requires [such]
order," and upon the conditions that the hearing for the preliminary
injunction be held "at the earliest possible time but in no event later
than three days" from the date the order is granted and that "a
decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction ... be rendered by
the court within three days" after the hearing on the motion. 77
74. NAL §§ C16-2.6(a), C16-2.8(a). In New York, it is the rule that a preliminary injunction
will not be granted unless it is established to the court's satisfaction that there is a strong
likelihood of plaintiff's success in the action and that he has no other available remedy. See Park
Terrace Caterers, Inc. v. McDonough, 9 App. Div. 2d 113, 191 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1959).
These principles would be applicable to the determination of motions for preliminary injunctions
under this legislation with one exception-the corporation counsel would not be required to show
that it has no adequate remedy at law. NAL § C16-2.5(a).
A defendant who is subject to a preliminary injunction may move at any time to vacate or
modify it. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6314 (McKinney 1963). He may also appeal to the Appellate
Division from the granting of a preliminary injunction. Id. § 5701(a)[2)(i).
75. NAL § C16-2.6(a).
76. Id. §§ C16-2.6(a), C16-2.8(a), C16-2.9(a).
77. Id. §§ C16-2.8(a), C16-2.9(a). According to Dean Jerome Prince, the term clear and
convincing evidence" has a meaning which is "none too clear" when used with respect to the
problem of burden of proof in the trial of civil cases. J. Prince, Richardson on Evidence 75 (10th
ed. 1973). Whatever the term may mean with respect to litigated hearings, it is not
applicable to judicial consideration of the temporary orders involved in the proposed law because
of the ex parte nature of these orders. By "clear and convincing evidence" this author means that,
after cautious and careful consideration of the evidence presented, the court must be reasonably
satisfied that the alleged nuisance exists, that its continued existence sufficiently threatens the
public health, safety, or welfare of the community so as to warrant an immediate, ex parte
interference with the property rights of the persons involved in the nuisance.
Service of either order would be required to be made personally in the manner provided for
civil process unless the court directed otherwise. NAL §§ C16-2.8(b), C16-2.9(b).
A temporary closing would direct the padlocking of the premises. Id. § C16-2. 10d). Both
temporary closing orders and temporary restraining orders would provide for the posting of
notices of the order and the order on the premises, and for inventory of the property on the
premises. Id. § C16-2.10(e) and (c).
Mutilation of posted notices or orders and wilful disobedience of the aforementioned orders
would be punishable offenses. Id. § C16-2.10(e) and (f).
These provisions for enforcement of temporary orders would also apply to preliminary
injunctions. Id. § C16-2.6(c).
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Under the legislation, a judgment awarding a permanent injunction
would also direct the seizure and sale of property used in the mainte-
nance of the nuisance, and would also award the city its actual costs,
disbursements, and expenses of investigating the business and of
bringing and maintaining the action. 7 8 Closing of the premises could
also be ordered for any period of up to a year from the date of
judgment. 79 The closing could be vacated upon the defendant's posting
a bond in the amount of the property involved and upon proof that the
nuisance would not be maintained during the period that the premises
had been ordered closed.80 The judgment could also authorize the city
to remove any construction found to violate the Building Code. 8 1
Finally, the judgment would become a lien upon the property where
the nuisance was maintained. 82 A defendant against whom a judgment
was entered would have the right to appeal to the Appellate Divi-
sion, 83 and to apply for a stay of enforcement either to the court
entering the judgment or to the Appellate Division. 84
2. The Action for a Civil Penalty
The action for a civil penalty would be commenced in the supreme
court by service of summons in the manner prescribed by the New
York CPLR upon all persons conducting, maintaining, or permit-
ting the nuisance. 85 Since the action would be civil in nature,8 6 the
CPLR would be applicable to the maintenance and prosecution of
the action. The parties would be entitled to a jury trial. 8 7
A temporary restraining or closing order could be vacated, after notice to the corporation
counsel, upon proof by a defendant that the nuisance has been abated and upon condition that
the corporation counsel have the right to inspect the premises to ascertain whether or not the
nuisance has been resumed. Id. § C 16-2.11(a). Such orders could also be vacated, upon notice, If
the court were satisfied that the public health, safety, or welfare will be protected during the
pendency of the action, and if the defendant posted a bond equal to the assessed valuation of the
property or in such amount as may be fixed by the court. Id. § C16-2.11(b).
A defendant subject to either of the aforementioned temporary orders would have further
remedies against such orders under the Civil Practice Law and Rules. He could move, without
notice, before the judge, who made the orders, to vacate or modify them or, in the alternative, he
could seek such relief in the Appellate Division. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 6314 & 5704(a)
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976).
78. NAL § C16-2.12(a) and (g).
79. Id. § C16-2.12(c).
80. Id.
81. Id. § C16-2.12(b).
82. Id. § C16-2.12(f).
83. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5701(a)(1) (McKinney 1963).
84. Id. § 5519(c).
85. NAL § C16-2.14(b). Venue would lie in the county where the nuisance exists.
86. Id. § C16-2.14(a).
87. This is true because the action is for a sum of money only. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4101(1)
(McKinney 1963); see Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302 (1897).
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After the commencement of the action, the court would be em-
powered, upon a contested hearing, to grant a preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendant from making a "bulk transfer," which the
legislation defines as "any transfer of the major part of the materials,
supplies, merchandise, or other inventory or equipment of the trans-
feror in . . . [premises] where the public nuisance is being conducted,
maintained or permitted that is not in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business."8 8 If a preliminary injunction is granted, a trial
of the action is required within three days of the entry of the order and
the action would have to be determined within three days after the
conclusion of the trial.8 9 The court could grant, ex parte, such a
temporary restraining order upon a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. 90 It could, however, only be granted if the court were satisfied
that there is "clear and convincing evidence that a public nuisance...
is being conducted, maintained, or permitted .... ,,91 A hearing on the
motion must be held "at the earliest possible time but in no event later
than three days" 92 from the date the order is granted and "a decision
on the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be rendered within
three days" after the hearing. 93
The statute creates two presumptions to enable corporation counsel to make out a prima facie
case at trial. See notes 10-il supra.
88. NAL § C16-2.15(b) & (c). The definition of the term "bulk sale" is derived from the
Uniform Commercial Code without, however, including the exceptions noted in that statute.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 6-102 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
89. NAL § C16-2.15(a). See note 74 supra for a discussion of the proof requisite for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Under the legislation, the corporation counsel would not be
required to establish lack of an adequate remedy at law. NAL § C16-2. 15(a). The officers serving
a temporary restraining order would be required to make an inventory of the personal property
used in the maintenance of the nuisance. Id. § C16-2.17(d).
A defendant could have a temporary injunction vacated upon posting a bond in the amount of
the civil penalty demanded in the complaint together with the projected amount of the actual
costs of the prosecution of the action as determined by the court; the application for this relief
would be required to be made on notice. Id. § C 16-2.18. In addition, further remedies would be
available to a defendant under the Civil Practice Law and Rules. See note 73, supra.
90. NAL § C16-2.15(a).
91. Id. § C16-2.17(a).
92. Id.
93. Id. With respect to the term "clear and convincing evidence," see note 77 supra. As used
in this section of the proposed law, the author intended this term to mean that, after cautious and
careful consideration of the evidence presented, the court must be reasonably satisfied that the
existence of the alleged nuisance has been sufficiently established so as to warrant an immediate
ex parte interference with the property rights of the persons involved in the nuisance. It should be
noted that the standard for a temporary order restraining a "bulk sale" is not as stringent as that
pertaining to a temporary closing order. See note 77 supra. The reason is that a temporary
restraint of a "bulk sale" is not as serious an interference with property rights as that resulting
from enforcement of a temporary closing order.
Section C16-2.14(c) mandates that a temporary restraining order cannot be granted unless the
court is satisfied that the defendants had knowledge of the nuisance involved, and provides that
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A judgment awarding the civil penalty is required to be in the
amount of one thousand dollars for each day the nuisance was main-
tained. 94 Enforcement by execution under the CPLR would be
available. 95 The judgment must also provide for seizure and destruc-
tion of the material found to be obscene. 96 A defendant against whom
such a judgment were entered would have the right to appeal to the
Appellate Division 97 and to obtain a stay of enforcement by follow-
ing the procedures outlined in the CPLR.98
IV. Two CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE LAW
1. The Temporary Closing Order
As has already been seen, a temporary closing order could be
granted in the action for a permanent injunction, upon the corporation
counsel's motion for a preliminary injunction.99 In drafting the provi-
sions which would govern the issuance of such an order, the author
was mindful of the constitutional dimension which such an order
would entail. Specifically, enforcement of the order would involve the
closing of a place of business and would deprive the owner of the use
of his property without a prior litigated hearing respecting the propri-
ety of the order. 100 In short, a question of due process would arise
under the United States Constitution.""
the presumption of knowledge set forth in section 235.10(1) of the Penal Law is applicable. Id. §
C16-2.14(c). That statute states with respect to criminal prosecutions: "A person who promotes
or wholesale promotes obscene material or possesses the same with the intent to promote or
wholesale promote it, in the course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of its
content and character." N.Y. Penal Law § 235.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976). It should be
noted that scienter has been held to be a constitutionally required element of any obscenity
offense. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Service of a temporary restraining order would be required to be made personally in the
manner provided for civil process unless the court directed otherwise. NAL § C16-2.17(b).
A defendant could have a temporary restraining order vacated upon posting a bond In the
amount of the civil penalty demanded in the complaint together with the projected amount of the
actual costs of the prosecution of the action as determined by the court; the application for this
relief would be required to be made on notice. Id. § C16-2.18. In addition, further remedies
would be available to a defendant under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See note
77 supra.
94. NAL § C16-2.14(a).
95. Id. § C16-2.19(b). Only non-obscene property could be seized by execution and sold. See
NAL § C16-2.19(a).
96. Id. § C16-2.19(a).
97. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5701(a)(1) (McKinney 1963).
98. Id. § 5519 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976).
99. See text at notes 74-84 supra.
100. NAL §§ C16-2.6(a), C16-2.8(a), C16-2.9(a) and (b).
101. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state "shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . " U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that, as a general
proposition, an ex parte seizure of property, that is, a seizure without a
prior adversary hearing, violates due process.10 2 Exceptions to the rule
do, however, exist. A government seizure without a prior hearing is
constitutionally permissible if
the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest... [if] there has been a special need for very prompt action ... [and if]
the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under
the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the
particular instance. Thus, the [United States Supreme] Court has allowed summary
seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the
needs of a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank
failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food. 10 3
In a civil action between private parties, a provisional remedy,
wherein a seizure is authorized without a prior hearing, is constitu-
tional under the following circumstances: if the provisional remedy
may only be granted by the court upon a verified affidavit demonstrat-
ing the circumstances underlying the need for the remedy; if the party
seeking the relief is required to post a bond; if the party against whom
the order is executed may recover possession by posting a bond or may
seek an immediate vacating order; and if a prompt hearing is accorded
after execution of the order. 1°4
Within the principles just enunciated, the temporary closing order
102. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
103. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (footnotes omitted). In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Puerto Rico statute which authorized the seizure of vessels used for unlawful purposes,
namely, transportation of narcotics, without prior notice or hearing. The constitutionality of the
seizure was sustained because there was a significant governmental purpose served in preventing
continued illicit use of the property, pre-seizure notice and hearing might have allowed the
property to be removed from the jurisdiction or concealed, and seizure had been initiated by
government officials, not self-interested private parties. Id. at 679. In contrast, a federal agency's
summary seizure pursuant to statute of a helicopter subject to a civil penalty was held violative of
due process because there was no showing of a need to protect the Government's interest in
collecting the penalty. United States v. Vertol H2 IC Reg. No. N8540, 545 F.2d 648. 651 (9th Cir.
1976).
In several cases, the New York courts have upheld summary seizure of property as constitu-
tional. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226, 23 N.E. 878 (1890), aff'd, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)
(summary seizure by a game inspector of nets used in illegal fishing in certain waters); People v.
Whitcomb, 273 App. Div. 610, 79 N.Y.S.2d 230 (4th Dep't 1948) (summary destruction of illegal
pinball machine).
104. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a Georgia
attachment statute violated due process because it authorized seizure without prior notice and
hearing and because it did not comply with the standards set forth in Mitchell, supra.
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provided by the legislation would not be violative of due process.
Although a closing without a prior litigated hearing is authorized, city
officials could not make such a closing without an order granted by a
judge predicated upon proof by affidavit.105 Such a closing order could
only be granted after the court had been satisfied by clear and
convincing evidence1 0 6 that a nuisance defined by the legislation as
subject to permanent injunctive relief'0 7 was established, and that the
public health, safety, or welfare required such order.' 0 8 Under the
legislation, the order could be vacated by the defendant's establishing
that the nuisance had been abated, by his posting a bond, or by
instituting ex parte procedures under the CPLR.109 A hearing would
be required "at the earliest possible time but in no event later than
three days" from the date of the order.' 10
2. The Civil Penalty as a Constitutional Alternative
to an Injunctive Remedy for Obscenity Nuisances
As previously mentioned, the Nuisance Abatement Law affords an
action for a permanent injunction against houses of prostitution,
premises used for promoting obscene performances, and certain de-
fined non-sexual nuisances.111 On the other hand, premises used for
the promotion of obscenity are subject to an action for a civil penalty
rather than one for injunctive relief. 112 As originally drafted by the
author, the Nuisance Abatement Law's action for a permanent injunc-
tion was inapplicable to premises used for the promotion of obscene
performances. Such a business would have been subject only to the
action for a civil penalty.
In the author's opinion, first amendment guarantees" 3 mandate a
remedial differentiation in the treatment of the nuisances defined by
the legislation. With respect to houses of prostitution and the non-
sexual nuisances, free speech considerations logically do not arise
105. NAL §§ C16-2.6(a), C16-2.8(a). In New York, pre-trial motions in civil actions are
normally made in writing. H. Wachtell, New York Practice Under the CPLR 197 (5th ed. 1976).
Such motions are brought either by notice of motion or by order to show cause supported by
affidavits. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 2211, 2214(a), (b), (d) (McKinney 1974).
106. NAL § C16-2.8(a); see note 77 supra.
107. The nuisances involved would include premises u3ed for purposes of prostitution as well
as the defined non-sex oriented nuisances. NAL §§ C16-2.2(a), (d)-(e), C16-2.4, C16-2.5(a),
C16-2.6(a), and C16-2.8(a); see text at note 65 supra.
108. NAL § C16-2.8(a).
109. Note 77 supra.
110. NAL § C16-2.8(a).
111. See text at note 65 supra.
112. See text at note 66 supra.
113. See note 49 supra, where the relevant provisions of the first amendment are set forth.
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because these nuisances involve conduct and not the communication of
ideas.' 1 4 On the other hand, the subject matter of the obscenity
nuisances, for example, drama, movies, books, and magazines, t5 do
entail free speech issues because these matters constitute protected free
speech unless they are in fact obscene. 116 Consequently, making
houses of prostitution and the non-sexual nuisances subject to injunc-
tive remedies would pose no free speech problems, while making the
obscenity nuisances liable to an injunction would almost certainly pose
such a problem.
The constitutional basis for the author's opinion is the principle that
restraints imposed prior to an adversary hearing respecting, and a
judicial decision determining that the restrained materials are obscene
violate the first amendment. 117 Application of the legislation's action
for an injunction to the obscenity nuisances might therefore run afoul
of this principle in two respects. Enforcement of the closing order" t8
and the judgment of permanent injunction' 19 would result in a closing
of the premises, thereby preventing the owner from producing perfor-
mances or promoting materials not judicially declared obscene after an
adversary hearing. Moreover, enforcement of a closing order which
has been granted solely on the basis of an ex parte showing would
prevent the owner of the premises from continuing the production of
performances or from promoting materials which, although judicially
declared obscene, had not been the subject of a prior adversary
hearing. In short, to apply the legislation's injunctive action to an
obscenity nuisance would result in an unconstitutional prior restraint
of free speech. 120
In the author's view, the application of the legislation's civil penalty
would not involve any unconstitutional restraint of free speech. As
intended by the author, and as required by the legislation, a temporary
114. See F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 202 (1976).
115. See NAL § C16-2.2(b), (c), and notes 10-11 supra.
116. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
117. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957), should not be construed as being contrary to the principle stated in the text. That case
held the predecessor of section 6330 of New York's present Civil Practice Law and Rules
constitutional under the first amendment. The statute is discussed in the text at notes 49-52 supra.
In Kingsley, the restraint, which involved the seizure and destruction of certain books, did not
occur until after a full adversary hearing and judicial determination that the books were obscene.
See F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 228-46 (1976), for a complete discussion of the doctrine of
prior restraint.
118. NAL § C16-2.10(d).
119. Id. § C16-2.12(c).
120. The view expressed in the text is generally shared by Professor Schauer. See F. Schauer,
The Law of Obscenity 240-241 (1976).
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order restraining a bulk transfer would be issued only to preserve the
status quo, that is, to prevent the owner of the premises from making a
mass transfer of his stock and other property and thereby defeating
enforcement of a later judgment. 12' Free speech would not be re-
strained because the owner of the premises would be free to continue
to present his movie or drama or to sell his books or magazines.
Furthermore, a civil penalty and seizure and destruction could only be
effected pursuant to a judgment entered after a trial and judicial
declaration of obscenity.122
The Nuisance Abatement Law enacted by the New York City
Council' 23 thus differs in one respect from that drafted by the author.
In its final form, nuisances involving obscene performances are subject
to the action for a permanent injunction; only nuisances involving pro-
motion of obscene material would be subject to the civil remedy. It
may be that a live performance such as a dance could be considered
conduct and thereby not protected by the first amendment. Yet, if a
live performance were found to admit of a speech component, then
first amendment guarantees would come into play. 124 Thus, the prob-
lem of prior restraint which the author sought to avoid in drafting the
Nuisance Abatement Law is present in the version enacted by the city
council. Nevertheless, cases in other jurisdictions have upheld statutes
prohibiting obscene performances as constitutional under the first
amendment.' 25 Thus, it may be that an injunction under these circum-
stances would not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.
V. CONCLUSION
In drafting the Nuisance Abatement Law the author had only one
goal in mind: the creation of an effective civil remedy for the elimina-
tion of illegal sex oriented businesses within a procedural framework
protective of our cherished constitutional rights. Whether the au-
thor's goal will be achieved will depend upon the energetic enforce-
ment of the Nuisance Abatement Law by public officials.
121. NAL §§ C16-2.15(b), C16-2.17(a). When a temporary restraining order is granted, a
hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction must be held within a certain time and the
motion decided within a certain time. Id. § C16-2.17(a). Furthermore, the order can only be
granted upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence". Id. § C16-2.17(a); see note 77 supra.
122. See NAL §§ C16-2.14 & C16-2.19.
123. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
124. See F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 200-05 (1976).
125. Maita v. Whitmore, 365 F. Supp. 1331, 1334-37 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975); see People v. Projection






The City of New York
Int. No. 1180 June 21, 1977
A LOCAL LAW
To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to
the defining of public nuisances and their abatement.
Be it enacted by the Council as follows:
Section 1: Chapter sixteen of the administrative code of the city of New




§ C16-2.0 Legislative declaration.-The Council of the City of New York
finds that in the city of New York commercial exploitation of explicit sexual
conduct through the public exhibition of lewd films, the public performance of
obscene acts, the sale of obscene publications, and the use of so-called
massage parlors and other premises for purposes of lewdness, assignation or
prostitution, constitutes a debasement and distortion of sensitive human
relationships central to family life, community welfare and the development
of human personality, is indecent and offensive to the senses and to public
morals and that such exploitation and flagrant violations of the building code,
health laws, zoning resolutions, licensing laws, environmental laws, laws
relating to the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages and laws relating
to gambling and dangerous drugs all interfere with the interest of the public in
the quality of life and total community environment, the tone of commerce in
the city, property values and the public safety; the council further finds that
the continued occurrence of such activities and violations is detrimental to the
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people of the city of New
York and of the businesses and visitors thereof. It is the purpose of the
council to place in one law all existing legal and equitable remedies relating to
the subject matter encompassed by this law and to strengthen existing laws on
the subject. This law shall apply to existing establishments which are engaged
presently in the type of activities herein declared to be public nuisances in the
city of New York.
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§ C16-2.1 Short Title.-This title shall be known as the "Nuisance
Abatement Law".
§ C16-2.2 Public nuisance defined.-The following are declared to be
public nuisances:
(a) Any building, erection or place used fbr the purpose of prostitution as
defined in section 230.00 of the penal law. Two or more criminal convic-
tions of persons for acts of prostitution in the building, erection or place,
within the one-year period preceding the commencement of an action under
this title, shall be presumptive evidence that the building, erection or place
is a public nuisance. In any action under this sub-division, evidence of the
common fame and general reputation of the building, erection or place, of
the inmates or occupants thereof, or of those resorting thereto, shall be
competent evidence to prove the existence of the public nuisance. If
evidence of the general reputation of the building, erection or place, or of
the inmates or occupants thereof, is sufficient to establish the existence of
the public nuisance, it shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge thereof
and acquiescence and participation therein and responsibility for the nui-
sance, on the part of the owners, lessors, lessees and all those in possession
of or having charge of, as agent or otherwise, or having any interest in any
form in the property, real or personal, used in conducting or maintaining
the public nuisance;
(b) Any building, erection or place used for the purpose of obscene
performances. The term "obscene" shall have the same meaning as that
term is defined in subdivision one of section 235.00 of the penal law. The
term "performance" shall have the same meaning as that term as defined in
subdivision three of section 235.00 of the penal law. Two or more convic-
tions, as defined in subdivision thirteen of section 1.20 of the criminal
procedure law, of persons for production, presentation or direction of an
obscene performance or for participation in such performance, in the
building, erection or place, within the one-year period preceding the
commencement of an action under this title shall be presumptive evidence
that the building, erection or place is a public nuisance;
(c) Any building, erection or place used for the purpose of promotion of
obscene material. The term "obscene" shall have the same meaning as that
term as defined in subdivision one of section 235.00 of the penal law. The
term "material" shall have the same meaning as that term as defined in
subdivision two of section 235.00 of the penal law. Two or more convic-
tions, as defined in subdivision thirteen of section 1.20 of the criminal
procedure law, of persons for promotion of or possession with intent to
promote obscene material in the building, erection or place, within the
one-year period preceding the commencement of an action under this title,
shall be presumptive evidence that the building, erection or place is a
public nuisance;
(d) Any building, erection or place, other than a one-or-two-family
dwelling classified in occupancy group J-3 pursuant to section C26-301.1 of
this code, which is in violation of article five of part one of title C of chapter
twenty-six of this code or of sub-articles 102.0, 103.0, 105.0, 109.0, 121.0 or
123.0 of article one of part two of title C of chapter twenty-six of this code.
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A conviction, as defined in subdivision thirteen of section 1.20 of the
criminal procedure law, of persons for offenses, as defined in subdivision
one of section 10.00 of the penal law, in violation of the aforesaid
provisions of this code in the building, erection or, place, within the period
of one-year preceding the commencement of an action under this title, shall
be presumptive evidence that the building, erection or place is a public
nuisance;
(e) Any building, erection or place, other than a one-or-two-family
dwelling classified in occupancy group J-3 pursuant to section C26-301.1 of
this code, which is a nuisance as defined in section 564-15.0 of this code or
which is an infected and uninhabitable house as defined in section 564-32.0
of this code or which is in violation of subdivision two of section 755(2)-7.0
of this code;
(f) Any building, erection or place used for the purpose of a business,
activity or enterprise which is not licensed as required by law;
(g) Any building, erection or place wherein, within the period of one year
prior to the commencement of an action under this title, there have
occurred five or more violations of any of the provisions of article two
hundred twenty and two hundred twenty-five of the penal law;
(h) Any building, erection or place used for any of the unlawful activities
described in section one hundred twenty-three of the alcoholic beverage
control law;
(i) Any building, erection or place wherein there is occurring a violation
of articles nine, eleven or thirteen of part two of chapter fifty-seven of this
code;
(j) Any building, erection or place wherein there is occurring a violation
of articles three or four of part three of chapter fifty-seven of this code;
(k) Any building, erection or place wherein there is occuring [sic] a viola-
tion of the zoning resolution of the city regulating "adult uses" and
() Any building, erection or place wherein there is occurring a criminal
nuisance as defined in section 240.45 of the penal law.
§ C 16-2.3 Remedies.-(a) The corporation counsel shall bring and maintain
a civil proceeding in the name of the city in the supreme court of the county in
which the building, erection or place is located to permanently enjoin the
public nuisances, defined in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j),
(k), and (1) of section C16-2.2 of this title, in the manner provided in article
one of this title.
(b) The corporation counsel shall bring and maintain a civil proceeding in
the name of the city, in the supreme court of the county in which the building,
erection or place is located to recover a civil penalty in relation to the public
nuisances defined in subdivision (c) of section C16-2.2 of this title, in the
manner provided in article two of this title.
ARTICLE I
§ C16-2.4 Applicability.-This article shall be applicable to the public
nuisances defined in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) and (1)
of section C16-2.2 of this title.
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§ C16-2.5- Action for permanent injunction.-(a) Generally. Upon the
direction of the mayor, or at the request of the head of a department or
agency of the city, or at the request of a district attorney of any county within
the city or upon his own initiative, the corporation counsel shall bring and
maintain a civil proceeding in the name of the city in the supreme court to
permanently enjoin a public nuisance within the scope of this article, and the
person or persons conducting, maintaining or permitting the public nuisance
from further conducting, maintaining or permitting the public nuisance. The
owner, lessor and lessee of a building, erection or place wherein the public
nuisance is being conducted, maintained or permitted shall be made defen-
dants in the action. The venue of such action shall be in the county where the
public nuisance is being conducted, maintained or permitted. The existence of
an adequate remedy at law shall not prevent the granting of temporary or
permanent relief pursuant to this article.
(b) The summons; the caption; naming the building, erection or place as
defendant. The corporation counsel shall name as defendants the building,
erection or place wherein the public nuisance is being conducted, maintained
or permitted, by describing it by block, lot number and street address and at
least one of the owners of some part of or interest in the property.
(c) In rem jurisdiction over building, erection or place. In rem jurisdiction
shall be complete bver the building, erection or place wherein the public
nuisance is being conducted, maintained or permitted by affixing the sum-
mons to the door of the building, erection or place and by mailing the
summons by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to one of
the owners of some part of or interest in the property. Proof of service shall be
filed within two days thereafter with the 'clerk of the court designated in the
summons. Service shall be complete upon such filing.
(d) Service of summons on other defendants. Defendants, other than the
building, erection or place wherein the public nuisance is being conducted,
maintained or permitted, shall be served with the summons as provided in the
civil practice law and rules.
(e) Notice of pendency. With respect to any action commenced or to be
commenced by him pursuant to this article, the corporation counsel may file a
notice of pendency pursuant to the provisions of article sixty-five of the civil
practice law and rules.
(f) Presumption of ownership. The person in whose name the real estate
affected by the action is recorded in the office of the city register or the county
clerk, as the case may be, shall be presumed to be the owner thereof.
(g) Presumption of employment or agency. Whenever there is evidence that
a person was the manager, operator, supervisor or, in any other way, in
charge of the premises, at the time a public nuisance was being conducted,
maintained or permitted, such evidence shall be presumptive that he was an
agent or employee of the owner or lessee of the building, erection or place.
(h) Penalty. If, upon the trial of an action under this title or, upon a motion
for summary judgment in an action under this title, a finding is made that the
defendant has intentionally conducted, maintained or permitted a public
nuisance defined in this title, a penalty, to be included in the judgment, may
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be awarded in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars for each day it is
found that the defendant intentionally conducted, maintained or permitted
the public nuisance. Upon recovery, such penalty shall be paid into the
general fund of the city.
§ C16-2.6 Preliminary injunction.--(a) Generally. Pending an action for a
permanent injunction as provided for in section C16-2.5 of this article, the
court may grant a preliminary injunction enjoining a public nuisance within
the scope of this article and the person or persons conducting, maintaining or
permitting the public nuisance from further conducting, maintaining or
permitting the public nuisance. An order granting a preliminary injunction
shall direct a trial of the issues within three days after joinder of issue or, if
issue has already been joined, within three days after the entry of the order.
Where a preliminary injunction has been granted, the court shall render a
decision with respect to a permanent injunction within three days after the
conclusion of the trial. A temporary closing order may be granted pending a
hearing for a preliminary injunction where it appears by clear and convincing
evidence that a public nuisance within the scope of this article is being
conducted, maintained or permitted and that the public health, safety or
welfare immediately requires the granting of a temporary closing order. A
temporary restraining order may be granted pending a hearing for a prelimi-
nary injunction where it appears by clear and convincing evidence that a
public nuisance within the scope of this article is being conducted, maintained
or permitted.
(b) Enforcement of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction shall
be enforced by the city agency at whose request the underlying action is being
brought. In the event the underlying action is being brought at the direction
of the mayor, or at the request of several city agencies or by the corporation
counsel, on his own initiative, or upon the request of a district attorney, the
order shall be enforced by the agency designated by the mayor. The police
department shall upon the request of the agency involved or upon the
direction of the mayor, assist in the enforcement of the preliminary injunc-
tion.
(c) Preliminary injunctions, inventory, closing of premises, posting of or-
ders and notices, offenses. If the court grants a preliminary injunction, the
provisions of section C16-2.10 of this article shall be applicable.
§ C16-2.7 Motion papers for preliminary injunction.-The corporation
counsel shall show, by affidavit and such other evidence as may be submitted,
that there is a cause of action for a permanent injunction abating a public
nuisance within the scope of this article.
§ C16-2.8 Temporary closing order.--(a) Generally. If, on a motion for a
preliminary injunction pursuant to section C16-2.6 of this article, the corpo-
ration counsel shall show by clear and convincing evidence that a public
nuisance within the scope of this article is being conducted, maintained or
permitted and that the public health, safety or welfare immediately requires a
temporary closing order, a temporary order closing such part of the building,
erection or place wherein the public nuisance is being conducted, maintained
or permitted may be granted without notice, pending order of the court
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granting or refusing the preliminary injunction and until further order of the
court. Upon granting a temporary closing order, the court shall direct the
holding of a hearing for the preliminary injunction at the earliest possible time
but in no event later than three days from the granting of such order; a
decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be rendered by the
court within three days after the conclusion of the hearing.
(b) Service of temporary closing order. Unless the court orders otherwise, a
temporary closing order together with the papers upon which it was based
and a notice of hearing for the preliminary injunction shall be personally
served, in the same manner as a summons as provided in the civil practice
law and rules.
§ C16-2.9 Temporary restraining order.--(a) Generally. If on a motion
for a preliminary injunction pursuant to section C16-2.6 of this article, the
corporation counsel shall show by clear and convincing evidence that a public
nuisance within the scope of this article is being conducted, maintained or
permitted and that the public health, safety or welfare immediately requires a
temporary restraining order, such temporary restraining order may be granted
without notice restraining the defendants and all persons from removing or in
any manner interfering with the furniture, fixtures and movable property used
in conducting, maintaining or permitting the public nuisance and from further
conducting, maintaining or permitting the public nuisance, pending order of
the court granting or refusing the preliminary injunction and until further
order of the court. Upon granting a temporary restraining order, the court
shall direct the holding of a hearing for the preliminary injunction at the
earliest possible time but in no event later than three days from the granting
of such order; a decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be
rendered by the court within three days after the conclusion of the hearing.
(b) Service of temporary restraining order. Unless the court orders other-
wise, a temporary restraining order and the papers upon which it was based
and a notice of hearing for the preliminary injunction shall be personally
served, in the same manner as a summons as provided in the civil practice
law and rules.
§ C16-2.10 Temporary closing order; temporary restraining order.--
(a) Generally. If on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the corporation
counsel submits evidence warranting both a temporary closing order and a
temporary restraining order, the court shall grant both orders.
(b) Enforcement of temporary closing orders and temporary restraining
orders. Temporary closing orders shall be enforced by the agency at whose
request the underlying action is being brought. In the event the underlying
action is being brought at the direction of the mayor, or at the request of
several city agencies or by the corporation counsel on his own initiative, or
upon the request of a district attorney, the order shall be enforced by the city
agency designated by the mayor. The police department shall, upon the
request of the agency involved or upon the direction of the mayor, assist in
the enforcement of a temporary closing order or a temporary restraining
order.
(c) Inventory upon service of temporary closing orders and temporary
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restraining orders. The officers serving a temporary closing order or a
temporary restraining order shall forthwith make and return to the court an
inventory of personal property situated in and used in conducting, maintain-
ing or permitting a public nuisance within the scope of this article and shall
enter upon the building, erection or place for such purpose.
(d) Closing of premises pursuant to temporary closing order. The officers
serving a temporary closing order shall, upon service of the order, command
all persons present in the building, erection or place to forthwith vacate the
premises. Upon the building, erection or place being vacated, the premises
shall be securely locked and all keys delivered to the officers serving the order
who thereafter shall deliver the keys to the fee owner, lessor or lessee of the
building, erection or place involved. If the fee owner, lessor or lessee is not at
the building, erection or place when the order is being executed, the officers
shall securely padlock the premises and retain the keys until the fee owner,
lessor or lessee of the building is ascertained, in which event, the officers shall
deliver the keys to such owner, lessor or lessee.
(e) Posting of temporary closing order and temporary restraining order;
posting of notices; offenses. Upon service of a temporary closing order or a
temporary restraining order, the officer shall post a copy thereof in a con-
spicuous place or upon one or more of the principal doors at entrances of such
premises where the public nuisance is being conducted, maintained or permit-
ted. In addition, where a temporary closing order has been granted, the
officers shall affix, in a conspicuous place or upon one or more of the principal
doors at entrances of such premises, a printed notice that the premises have
been closed by court order, which notice shall contain the legend "closed by
court order" in block lettering of sufficient size to be observed by anyone
intending or likely to enter the premises, the date of the order, the court from
which issued and the name of the office or agency posting the notice. In
addition, where a temporary restraining order has been granted, the officers
shall affix, in the same manner, a notice similar to the notice provided for in
relation to a temporary closing order except that the notice shall state that
certain described activity is prohibited by court order and that removal of
property is prohibited by court order. Mutilation or removal of such a posted
order or such a posted notice while it remains in force, in addition to any
other punishment prescribed by law, shall be punishable, on conviction, by a
fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding fifteen days, or by both, provided such order or notice contains
therein a notice of such penalty. The police department shall, upon the
request of the agency involved or upon the direction of the mayor, assist in
the enforcement of this subdivision.
(f) Intentional disobedience of or resistance to temporary closing order or
temporary restraining order. Intentional disobedience of or resistance to a
temporary closing order or a temporary restraining order, in addition to any
other punishment prescribed by law, shall be punishable on conviction, by a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding
six months or by both.
§ C16-2.11 Temporary closing order; temporary restraining order, defen-
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dant's remedies.--(a) A temporary closing order or a temporary restraining
order shall be vacated, upon notice to the corporation counsel, if the defen-
dant shows by affidavit and such other proof as may be submitted that the
public nuisance within the scope of this article has been abated. An order
vacating a temporary closing order or a temporary restraining order shall
include a provision authorizing agencies of the city to inspect the building,
erection or place which is the subject of an action pursuant to this title,
periodically without notice, during the pendency of the action for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not the public nuisance has been resumed. Inten-
tional disobedience of or resistance to an inspection provision of an order
vacating a temporary closing order of a temporary restraining order, in
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law, shall be punishable, on
conviction, by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprison-
ment not exceeding six months, or by both. The police department shall, upon
the request of the agency involved or upon the direction of the mayor, assist
in the enforcement of an inspection provision of an order vacating a tempo-
rary closing order or temporary restraining order.
(b) A temporary closing order or a temporary restraining order may be
vacated by the court, upon notice to the corporation counsel, when the
defendant gives an undertaking and the court is satisfied that the public
health, safety or welfare will be protected adequately during the pendency of
the action. The undertaking shall be in an amount equal to the assessed
valuation of the building, erection or place where the public nuisance is being
conducted, maintained or permitted or in such other amount as may be fixed
by the court. The defendant shall pay to the city, in the event a judgment of
permanent injunction is obtained, its actual costs, expenses and disburse-
ments in investigating, bringing and maintaining the action.
§ C16-2.12 Permanent injunction.--(a) A judgment awarding a perma-
nent injunction pursuant to this article may direct the sheriff to seize and
remove from the building, erection or place all material, equipment and
instrumentalities used in the creation and maintenance of the public nuisance
and shall direct the sale by the sheriff of such property in the manner
provided for the sale of personal property under execution pursuant to the
provisions of the civil practice law and rules. The net proceeds of any such
sale, after deduction of the lawful expenses involved, shall be paid into the
general fund of the city.
(b) A judgment awarding a permanent injunction pursuant to this article
may authorize agents of the city to forthwith remove and correct construction
and structural alterations as provided in section C26-85.5 of this code.
(c) A judgment awarding a permanent injunction pursuant to this article
may direct the closing of the building, erection or place by the sheriff, to the
extent necessary to abate the nuisance, and shall direct the sheriff to post a
copy of the judgment and a printed notice of such closing conforming to the
requirements of subdivision (e) of section C16-2.10 of this article. Mutilation
or removal of such a posted judgment or notice while it remains in force, in
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law, shall be punishable, on
conviction, by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars or by
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imprisonment not exceeding fifteen days, or by both, provided such judgment
contains therein a notice of such penalty. The closing directed by the
judgment shall be for such period as the court may direct but in no event shall
the closing be for a period of more than one year from the posting of the
judgment provided for in this subdivision. If the owner shall file a bond in the
value of the property order to be closed and submits proof to the court that
the nuisance has been abated and will not be created, maintained or permit-
ted for such period of time as the building, erection or place has been directed
to be closed in the judgment, the court may vacate the provisions of the
judgment that direct the closing of the building, erection or place. A dosing
by the sheriff pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision shall not consti-
tute an act of possession, ownership or control by the sheriff of the closed
premises.
(d) Intentional disobedience or resistance to any provision of a judgment
awarding a permanent injunction pursuant to this title, in addition to any
other punishment prescribed by law, shall be punishable by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
by both.
(e) Upon the request of the agency involved or upon the direction of the
mayor, the police department shall assist in the enforcement of a judgment
awarding a permanent injunction entered in an action brought pursuant to
this title.
(f) A judgment rendered awarding a permanent injunction pursuant to this
article shall be and become a lien upon the building, erection or place named
in the complaint in such action, such lien to date from the time of filing a
notice of lis pendens in the office of the clerk of the county wherein the
building, erection or place is located. Every such lien shall have priority
before any mortgage or other lien that exists prior to such filing except tax and
assessment liens.
(g) A judgment awarding a permanent injunction pursuant to this title shall
provide, in addition to the costs and disbursements allowed by the civil
practice law and rules, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or such other
evidence as may be submitted, the actual costs, expenses and disbursements
of the city in investigating, bringing and maintaining the action.
ARTICLE 2
§ C16-2.13 Applicability.-This article shall be applicable to public nui-
sances defined in subdivision (c) of section C16-2.2 of this title.
§ C16-2.14 Action for civil penalty.-(a) Generally. Upon the direction of
the mayor, or at the request of the head of a department or agency of the city,
or at the request of a district attorney of any county within the city or upon
his own initiative, the corporation counsel shall bring and maintain a civil
proceeding in the name of the city in the supreme court to recover a civil
penalty against any person conducting, maintaining or permitting a public
nuisance within the scope of this article. The amount of any civil penalty
awarded in a judgment entered pursuant to this article shall be in an amount
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of one thousand dollars for each day the public nuisance has been conducted,
maintained or permitted. Upon recovery, such penalty shall be paid into the
general fund of the city. The venue of such action shall be in the county
wherein the public nuisance is being conducted, maintained or permitted.
(b) The summons and its service; naming' of parties as defendants. The
corporation counsel shall name as defendants all persons conducting, main-
taining or permitting a public nuisance within the scope of this article. Other
persons may be named as defendants pursuant to the rules governing joinder
of parties set forth in the civil practice law and rules. The summons shall be
served in the manner provided by the civil practice law and rules.
(c) Scienter. A temporary restraining order shall not be granted nor shall a
judgment be entered against a defendant unless the court is satisfied that the
defendant had knowledge of the public nuisance which he conducted, main-
tained or permitted. The presumption of knowledge provided by subdivision
one of section 235.10 of the penal law shall be applicable to this article.
§ C16-2.15 Preliminary injunction.--(a) Generally. Pending an action
pursuant to section C16-2.14 of this article, the court may grant a preliminary
injunction enjoining a defendant from making a bulk transfer, as defined in
subdivision (b) of this section. An order granting a preliminary injunction
shall direct a trial of the issues within three days after joinder of issue or, if
issue has already been joined, within three days after entry of the order.
Where a preliminary injunction has been granted the court shall render a
decision with respect to the final determination of the action within three days
after the conclusion of the trial. A temporary restraining order may be granted
pending a hearing for a preliminary injunction where it appears by clear and
convincing evidence that a public nuisance within the scope of this article is
being conducted, maintained or permitted. The existence of an adequate
remedy at law shall not prevent the granting of a temporary injunction or a
temporary restraining order pursuant to this article.
(b) "Bulk transfer" defined. A "bulk transfer" is any transfer of a major
part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory or equipment
of the transfer or in the building, erection or place where the public nuisance
is being conducted, maintained or permitted that is not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business.
(c) Enforcement of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction shall
be enforced by the agency or agencies specified in subdivision (b) of section
C16-2.6 of this title.
(d) Preliminary injunction; inventory. If the court grants a preliminary
injunction, the provisions of subdivision (d) of section C16-2.17 of this article
shall be applicable.
§ C16-2.16 Motion papers for preliminary injunction.-The corporation
counsel shall show, by affidavit and such other evidence as may be submitted,
that there is a cause of action for a civil penalty within the scope of this
article.
§ C16-2.17 Temporary restraining order.--a) Generally. If on a motion
for a preliminary injunction pursuant to section C16-2.15 of this article, the
corporation counsel shall show by clear and convincing evidence that a public
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nuisance within the scope of this article is being conducted, maintained or
permitted, a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice
restraining the defendants and all persons from making or permitting a "bulk
transfer" as defined in subdivision (b) of section C11-2.15, pending order of
the court granting or refusing the preliminary injunction and until further
order of the court. Upon granting a temporary restraining order, the court
shall direct the holding of a hearing for a preliminary injunction at the earliest
possible time but in no event later than three days from the granting of such
order; a decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be rendered
by the court within three days after the conclusion of the hearing.
(b) Service of temporary restraining order. Unless the court orders other-
wise, a temporary restraining order and the papers upon which it was based
and a notice of hearing for a preliminary injunction shall be personally
served, in the same manner as a summons as provided in the civil practice
law and rules.
(c) Enforcement of temporary restraining order. A temporary restraining
order shall be enforced by the city agency or agencies specified in subdivision
(b) of section C16-2.6 of this title.
(d) Inventory upon service of temporary restraining order. The officers
serving a temporary restraining order shall forthwith make and return to the
court an inventory of personal property situated in and used in conducting,
maintaining or permitting a public nuisance within the scope of this article
and shall enter upon the building, erection or place for such purpose.
§ C16-2.18 Vacating a temporary injunction or a temporary restraining
order.-When the defendant gives an undertaking in the amount of the civil
penalty demanded in the complaint together with costs, disbursements and
the projected actual costs of the prosecution of the action to be determined by
the court, upon a motion of notice to the corporation counsel, a temporary
injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be vacated by the court. The
provisions of the civil practice law and rules governing undertakings shall be
applicable to this article.
§ C16-2.19 Judgment.--(a) Seizure and destruction of obscene material.
A judgment awarding a civil penalty pursuant to this article shall direct the
sheriff to seize and remove from the building, erection or place and to
forthwith destroy all material found by the court or jury to be obscene as
defined in section 235.00 of the penal law.
(b) Enforcement of the judgment for a civil penalty. A judgment awarding
a civil penalty shall be enforced by the sheriff pursuant to the provisions of
the civil practice law and rules.
ARTICLE 3
§ C16-2.20 Title not exclusive remedy.-This title shall not be construed
to exclude any other remedy provided by law for the protection of the health,
safety and welfare of the people of the city of New York.
§ C16-2.21 Separability.-If any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivi-
sion, section or part of this title shall be adjudged by any court of competent
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jurisdiction to be invalid, in whole or in part, such judgment shall not affect,
impair or invalidate the remainder thereof or the application of any such
clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or part of this title to other
persons and circumstances.
§ 2. This local law shall take effect immediately.
